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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
During the Cold War, Guatemala endured the misfortune of setting precedents for 
the United States’ foreign policy in Latin America. In 1954, the Central Intelligence 
Agency orchestrated a coup that overthrew the democratically elected President of 
Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz, in what would be the first of many anti-communist 
interventions over the next four decades. The United States hailed the 1954 coup as an 
important Cold War victory in a time of communist expansion. The need to maintain 
Guatemala as an ally and symbol of US victory only increased with the onset of the 
Cuban Revolution. In order to combat the perceived threats from Cuba and the Soviet 
Union, President Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress, an ambitious economic aid 
program designed to compete with communism for the hearts and minds of Latin 
America’s underprivileged. In Guatemala, however, Alliance for Progress initiatives were 
undermined by Cold War fears of reform leading to revolution.   
 This study examines the failure of US foreign policy in Guatemala during the 
Kennedy administration by focusing on the actions of the United States’ Ambassador to 
Guatemala, John Bell, who held that office from December 1961 to September 1965. 
President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, branded as “enlightened anti-communism” 
was meant to be a departure from his predecessors’ reliance on dictators to maintain US 
dominance in Latin America.1 Instead, the United States found itself unable to meet the 
dual demands of security and development in Guatemala because anti-communism 
superseded economic and social reform in the struggle to win the Cold War. Ambassador 
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Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 196.  
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Bell arrived in Guatemala armed with an impressive résumé, but a shallow understanding 
of the region and his mission. As a result, the limits of US power and influence became 
glaringly apparent as Bell juggled Guatemalan politics, combatted perceived communist 
threats, and tried to implement contradicting demands from Washington.   
Guatemala had been experiencing a perpetual state of crisis since the October 
Revolution of 1944, and the overthrow of the government ten years later made a difficult 
situation worse. The Central American republic held relatively little economic value, but 
its geographical proximity and the success of the 1954 coup required the United States to 
maintain Guatemala as a staunch ally. Taken together, the state of perpetual turmoil and 
the necessity of maintaining a strong relationship between the United States and 
Guatemala demanded adroit diplomacy and leadership from US emissaries. John O. Bell, 
appointed Ambassador to Guatemala in 1961, proved a competent and diligent diplomat 
in previous assignments, but lacked the flexibility and foresightedness that Guatemala 
needed at a critical historical juncture.  
Convinced that Guatemala faced a nascent threat akin to Fidel Castro, Bell and his 
superiors in Washington required expedient, stabilizing solutions that they believed only 
the Guatemalan military could provide. Following the logic dictated by the Kennedy 
administration, Ambassador Bell paved the way for military dictatorship in Guatemala by 
amending US policy to reflect the primacy of anti-communism. As a result, the political, 
economic, and social reforms promised by the Alliance for Progress, so desperately 
needed in war-torn Guatemala, fell by the wayside in favor of establishing a 
counterinsurgency state. In choosing the Guatemalan military as primary ally of the 
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United States in the country instead of developing stronger civil institutions, Ambassador 
Bell unwittingly contributed to Guatemala’s descent into a 36 year Civil War. 
  It should also be noted that historical analysis on Guatemala during the 1960s is 
nearly non-existent in English-language sources. Most scholarship on US-Guatemalan 
relations revolves around two watershed events: the 1954 CIA-sponsored coup of 
Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz and the genocide of Guatemalan Maya perpetuated 
by the Guatemalan government during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Some secondary 
literature addresses this period as part of a larger study on Latin America during the Cold 
War.  Stephen Rabe has produced two of the most focused works on US-Latin American 
relations during the Cold Wars, and in his studies, Rabe has dedicated several sections to 
the United States and Guatemala during the Kennedy administration and beyond. In The 
Most Dangerous Area in the World, Rabe contends that the Alliance for Progress failed 
because Kennedy’s administration placed too much faith in developmental theories and 
the belief that the United States could dictate political outcomes in Latin America.2 
Moreover, when US interest faced and immediate threat, especially one that challenged 
the United States tradition of dominance in the Western Hemisphere, Kennedy relied on 
military options to maintain the sphere of influence. Others, such as Suzanne Jonas, have 
mentioned the period in polemical works on US-Guatemalan relations and condemned 
the United States as a knowing architect of a murderous terror-state.   
One of the most prolific scholars on US-Latin American relations, Walter 
LaFeber, contended that the United States had willingly set up a system of dominance 
over Latin America following the Spanish-American War, and that the Cold War was and 
ideologically tinged continuance of this hegemonic relationship. Guatemala features in 
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LaFeber’s writing as the testing ground for the United States for economic imperialism 
and later as a laboratory of counterinsurgency.  Most historians, however, who address 
this period use it as background to more detailed studies of Guatemalan political, social, 
and economic life. Although thousands of documents from the State Department, CIA, 
Department of Defense, and the Executive Office of the President have been declassified 
and made widely available through online resources, a detailed study of this period is still 
desperately needed by scholars of the Cold War, US foreign policy, and Latin America.
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CHAPTER II 
ORIGINS 
 After World War II, international competition with the Soviet Union caused anti-
communism to feature prominently in both the domestic and foreign policy of the United 
States. The chief component of the foreign policy was containment, an approach 
formulated by respected statesman George F. Kennan during the Truman administration. 
Taking the Soviet Union as his subject, Kennan argued that peaceful coexistence between 
capitalist and communist countries was impossible because of the expansionist ideology 
of communism.1 In Kennan’s view, preventing the spread of communism might cause it 
to collapse under its inherent economic dysfunction, or cause it to soften from exposure 
to capitalist markets. By 1949, the detonation of the first Soviet atomic weapon and Mao 
Zedong’s victory in China seemed to prove that international communism was indeed an 
existential threat and Kennan’s call to confront the global menace dominated the actions 
of the United States and its allies for the next four decades. 
 After formulating a cornerstone of US-Cold War policy, Truman’s first Secretary 
of State, George Marshall, appointed  Kennan to head the State Department’s Policy 
Planning Staff. In 1950, he travelled throughout Latin American to meet with 
ambassadors and assess the United States’ southern neighbors.2 Kennan felt that the 
geographical, cultural, and racial qualities of Latin America made the region and its 
people inherently backwards. Citing Catholicism, tropical climate, and racial mixing as 
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the root of Latin America’s troubles, Kennan observed, “it seems to me unlikely that 
there could be any region on the earth in which nature and human behavior could have 
combined to produce a more unhappy and hopeless background for the conduct of human 
life than in Latin America.”3 Even so, in the larger geopolitical struggle of the Cold War, 
Kennan maintained that Latin America must remain the United States’ uncontested 
sphere of influence. The Truman administration, molded by Kennan’s ethnocentric 
approach, pushed anti-communism as the preeminent feature of US policy in Latin 
America through military aid, support of dictatorial regimes, political repression, and, if 
the need arose, direct intervention. The Kennan Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, a term 
coined by historian Gaddis Smith, called for the United States to intervene in Latin 
American countries in order to save them from the communist threat that their leaders 
where incapable of handling.4 Echoing Theodore Roosevelt’s view of Latin America, the 
United States would rely on local dictators to maintain order and use its military might if 
its patrons failed to secure its political and economic interests.  
 Guatemala presented the first challenge to maintaining the United States’ 
dominance within its declared sphere of influence. In 1944, Juan Jose Arevalo became 
Guatemala’s first popularly elected president after a group of young, military officers 
overthrew General Juan Federico Ponce, the most recent successor to a long line of 
military dictatorships. A philosophy professor of considerable charisma and charm, 
President Arevalo ushered in an era of reform known as the “Ten Years of Spring.” 
During his term in office, Arevalo established a social security system, legalized unions, 
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 Gaddis Smith,  The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1994), 68. 
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set a minimum wage, rebuilt the education system, and reached out to indigenous 
communities by encouraging increased civil participation. His administration also crafted 
a new constitution that divided the power of the state into executive, legislative and 
judicial branches, and guaranteed basic human rights. The traditional Guatemalan 
oligarchy of landed elites and military brass chafed at Arevalo’s reforms, but lacked the 
popular base to challenge a president who had won eighty-five percent of the vote.5 
United Fruit Company, which owned a large percent of the arable land in Guatemala, also 
expressed concern about the motives of the reformer president. Arevalo’s enemies 
pointed to his vaguely defined personal doctrine of “spiritual socialism,” which they 
claimed was a thinly disguised communism. Arevalo himself stated that spiritual 
socialism would transcend communism and fascism, liberalism and conservatism, “to 
liberate men psychologically” with a balance of personal freedom and community 
cooperation.6 As Arevalo’s term continued, conservative opposition, especially from the  
upper brass of the military, stymied his reforms and threatened his presidency with more 
than twenty failed coup attempts.7 His successor, Jacobo Arbenz, would face even greater 
threats. 
Arbenz was one of the military leaders of the 1944 revolution that ended 
Guatemala’s military dictatorship. Under Arevalo, he became Minster of Defense and the 
president’s chosen successor. After winning the 1950 election, Arbenz decided he would 
                                                 
5
 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, ( New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press,1991), 36. 
6
 Juan Jose Arevalo, “A New Guatemala,” in The Guatemala Reader ,eds. Greg Grandin and Deborah 
Levenson (London: Duke University Press, 2011), 208. 
7
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push for more radical change. One of his first actions as president was the legalization of 
the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT)—the Guatemalan communist party. This 
action generated considerable concern in Washington, which had tolerated Arevalo’s 
liberalism with decreasing patience.  
Arbenz was not a communist, but Marxist thought certainly influenced his 
political beliefs. He saw the feudalistic finca system, a plantation economy that shackled 
the Guatemalan economy to a few export crops and effectively enslaved much of the 
country’s indigenous population, as the primary cause of economic and political 
underdevelopment. In order to foster greater economic participation in the free market, 
Arbenz believed that peasants needed a substantial increase in both communal and 
private property. The Guatemalan legislature fulfilled Arbenz’s campaign promise of 
land reform when it passed the Agrarian Reform Law in May, 1952. The new law called 
for the immediate expropriation large tracts of uncultivated land for redistribution to 
small Guatemalan farmers and peasants.8 Five weeks later, on June 17, 1952, the 
president issued Decree 900, which established the hierarchical system that would 
implement the new law. Unlike the radical land reforms under Stalin and Mao, Arbenz’s 
system was gradual and bureaucratic, with local agrarian committees having to push 
petition through several layers of administrators before their claim to land could be 
considered.9 Nevertheless, when Arbenz realized his dream, he also sealed his fate. 
 United Fruit Company stood to lose considerable assets as a result of these land 
reforms. The company had greatly undervalued its holdings over the previous decades to 
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9
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avoid taxation, and when Arbenz offered compensation at the declared value, UFCo 
executives responded by claiming that Arbenz was a communist. The Eisenhower 
administration supported United Fruit. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his 
brother, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, were major 
shareholders in United Fruit, and both had acted as legal consultants for the company 
when the brothers worked at the prestigious law firm, Sullivan & Cromwell. Under their 
direction, the State Department and the CIA mounted a campaign against Arbenz that 
isolated the country from regional and international allies, blockaded Guatemalan ports, 
and spread falsehoods to the effect that the president was a communist subversive.  
The CIA also covertly trained a band of mercenaries and exiles in Honduras under 
the command of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, a conservative militarist who had been 
exiled after attempting to overthrow Arevalo in 1949, to act as a ‘liberation force’ that 
would remove Arbenz. In May 1954, the CIA commenced Operation PBSUCCESS, 
combining an invasion by Castillo Armas’s armed group with an extensive 
disinformation campaign that included invented radio battle reports, air-dropping of anti-
Arbenz leaflets, sabotage, and claims that a full-scale US invasion was forthcoming. 
Fearing that US Marines would soon arrive if they resisted, the upper echelons of the 
Guatemalan military refused to act, commanding their forces to remain in the barracks. 
When Arbenz attempted to arm a civilian militia of loyalists as a defense against Castillo 
Armas and the potential US invasion force, the military turned against their president and 
forced him to resign. Colonel Castillo Armas assumed the position of president and 
immediately overturned ten years of reforms. The United States now had an ally in 
control of Guatemala. 
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After the 1954 coup, US policymakers focused on state-building and economic 
recovery, though preventing communist influence was always an important part of the 
agenda. When Guatemalans called for Castillo Armas to drop his emergency dictatorial 
powers and restore some semblance of democracy to the country, the US embassy 
concurred.10 Its preferred approach was to support Castillo Armas financially as he 
formed a loyal political party, while also cultivating potential opponents of the president: 
opponents who the US mission considered politically reliable.11 The State Department 
saw that there was a potential danger in adopting this approach, as an unfriendly, left-
leaning government could come to power as a result of increased democratization, but 
that possibility did not stop the US from advocating development and elections.12 After 
an assassin ended Castillo Armas’s presidency in 1957, the United States sponsored a 
presidential election, marred by claims of fraud and voter intimidation, that brought a 
conservative general, Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, to the presidency. 
 The threat of a pro-communist seizure of power in Guatemala seemed more 
concrete after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and, few, if any, events had greater impact 
on US Cold War policies in Latin America. Fidel Castro, doctor-turned-revolutionary, 
after suffering military defeat, imprisonment, and exile, toppled the corrupt dictator and 
US ally, Fulgencio Batista. Castro led his July 26 movement, named after his failed 
assault on the Moncada barracks in 1953, into Havana after six years of building the 
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small group of political dissidents into a guerilla army. The Eisenhower administration 
was suspicious of the popular revolutionary leader despite Castro’s emphatic assurances 
that he and his government were not communists.13 Ironically, Moscow also had 
difficulty discerning the aims of Cuba’s new leader and worked closely with his brother 
Raul Castro to gain influence within the new regime. After Castro’s agrarian reform law 
of 1959 expropriated over one thousand acres of farmland for redistribution, the already 
troubled relations between the United States and Cuba rapidly deteriorated.14 The 
Eisenhower administration made little effort to win over the Cuban government. 
Likewise, Castro and his followers often denounced the United States for its neocolonial 
rule of Cuba. By 1961, the Cuban revolutionary government nationalized US property, 
and Fidel Castro announced: “I am a Marxist-Leninist, and I will continue to be a 
Marxist-Leninist until the last days of my life.”15 Communism had claimed its first 
country within the Western Hemisphere. 
In Guatemala, a third of the army revolted against the oppressive and corrupt 
Ydigoras government in 1960. Although these officers were nationalists who demanded a 
just government established through fair elections, the uprising fed US fears about 
communist infiltration in the region. The objectives of the US mission in Guatemala 
shifted: uncovering “the international Soviet Communist conspiracy” became the order of 
the day, but policymakers wanted to counter communist influence with developmental 
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projects and media manipulation, not the suspension of elections.16 Once the relatively 
inexperienced Kennedy administration confronted problems that required immediate 
responses, the long-term goals of development and democratization were undermined by 
defaulting to military solutions. 
 
 Two years after Castro greeted cheering crowds as he rolled into Havana atop a 
tank, John F. Kennedy became the thirty-fifth president of the United States. Ambitious, 
dynamic, and the youngest president to date, Kennedy embodied the potential and energy 
of the 1960s. In his presidential campaign, Kennedy lambasted the Eisenhower 
administration for not waging the Cold War effectively. Although the most well-known 
accusation Kennedy made was the baseless claim of a growing “missile-gap” created by 
the rapid increase in the Soviet nuclear arsenal, Kennedy also blamed the Eisenhower 
administration for mishandling Cuba.17 Kennedy had his own bold, new plan for winning 
the Cold War in Latin America: the Alliance for Progress. 
 On March 13, 1961, Kennedy gathered two-hundred fifty guests, selected from 
the diplomatic corps and Congress, in the White House for a lavish ceremony. Broadcast 
by the Voice of America in English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese, President Kennedy 
announced a renewed partnership between the United States and Latin America that 
would “complete the revolution of the Americas, to build a hemisphere where all men 
                                                 
16
 Frederick J. Barcroft, “Country Assessment Report – Guatemala,” February 3, 1961, Digital National 
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can hope for a suitable standard of living, and all can live out their lives in dignity and in 
freedom.”18 The Alliance for Progress, in spirit, was a quasi-Marshall Plan for Latin 
America that promised to help fund economic and social development in the region. 
Kennedy championed education, public health, and most significantly, tax and land 
reform. After the passage of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, a new organization, the 
Agency for International Development (USAID/AID) emerged to administer assistance 
programs.19 Although, in his speech, Kennedy invoked the American and Bolivian 
revolutions that liberated much of the Western Hemisphere from colonial rule, the 
President and his advisors feared that the region was vulnerable to radical social 
revolution.20 A product of the modernization theory postulate that material improvement 
would induce social and political progress, the Alliance for Progress offered an 
alternative to the Cuban model. Some scholars, such as Lars Schoultz, have asserted that 
the Alliance for Progress was little more than Dollar Diplomacy with “social science 
window dressing.”21 At the time, however, many Latin American governments embraced 
the Alliance because it seemed to mark a significant shift in US policy toward the region.  
 For all the idealism and potential of the Alliance for Progress, the Kennedy 
administration faced significant hurdles of implementation. No member of Kennedy’s 
cabinet or White House staff had extensive experience or expertise in Latin American 
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affairs. Although some influential aides, such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr., provided advice 
on the region and supported the Alliance, most major policy decisions fell to the 
president alone.22 And he got little help—Secretary of State Dean Rusk had little interest 
in the region and viewed it as peripheral to concerns in Europe and Asia. One of Rusk’s 
staffers complained that Rusk gave as much attention to Western New Guinea as he did 
Latin America.23 Most officials, including Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs, Edwin Martin, lacked fluency in Spanish. Ambassador to Guatemala, John Bell, 
was no exception to the rule and came to his office with little experience in Latin 
America beyond infrequent travel and minimal “classroom” Spanish.24 Without 
knowledgeable, skilled officials, Kennedy’s ambitious project lacked a crucial 
component necessary for a major policy shift. 
 The United States’ legacy of militarism in both its historic relationship with Latin 
America and the prosecution of the Cold War proved an even greater challenge to 
overcome. Kennedy wanted to avoid the mistakes of the recent past by cutting ties with 
dictators who curried the United States’ favor by professing their anti-communist 
credentials.25 At the same time, Kennedy recognized that military aid was necessary for 
maintaining influence over Latin American armed forces. As a result, USAID did not 
restrict its funding to developmental projects and often contributed to police and military 
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forces. In Guatemala, as we shall see, security forces not only received the bulk of US 
foreign aid, but also became responsible for implementing Alliance for Progress 
initiatives ranging from building schools to reforestation projects. The Guatemalan Army, 
which shouldered most of these new responsibilities, used the funds to indoctrinate 
youths, control vital resources like clean water and medicine, and to gain greater control 
over civil society. Kennedy’s high-minded rhetoric failed to match his actions, and anti-
communist strongmen continued to enjoy the patronage of the United States. 
 The failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 compounded the 
weaknesses and contradictions within the Kennedy administration’s plans for US-Latin 
American relations and critically undermined the goals of the Alliance for Progress. 
Kennedy had inherited the plan to invade Cuba from the Eisenhower administration. In 
fact, Eisenhower cautioned Kennedy that the Soviets and their allies were on the 
offensive and that hemispheric security rested on removing Castro from power.26 Hoping 
to win a clear victory and establish his credentials as a Cold Warrior, Kennedy moved 
ahead with Eisenhower’s operation. The invasion, modeled to a large extent on the 
overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala, did not enjoy the success of its 
predecessor. Castro had anticipated an invasion, and built a two-hundred thousand man 
militia to support the regular army, and had arrested one-hundred thousand Cubans with 
questionable loyalty to prevent a potential uprising.27 On April 17, the fifteen-hundred 
strong force of CIA-trained exiles landed at the isolated bay and met heavy resistance. 
Faced with an unfolding disaster, Kennedy withheld vital air support to avoid the direct 
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involvement of the United States. The invasion force became stranded along the beach as 
Cuba’s Soviet-made tanks and aircraft routed the would-be attackers and cut off their 
supply lines. Kennedy took personal responsibility for the failed mission and the 
humiliation significantly shaped his administration’s work in Latin America.28 
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CHAPTER III 
CAREER COLD WARRIOR 
The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion dealt a serious blow to the United States. 
Fidel Castro now had a unifying symbol to rally the Cuban people to his socialist 
revolution and his partnership with the Soviet Union became much stronger. Kennedy 
felt personally disgraced by the failed invasion, and the president waged a clandestine 
war against Cuba, utilizing sabotage, terrorism, and assassination, in an attempt to bring 
down Castro’s regime. The Kennedy administration became fixated on the need to 
prevent another Cuba. Now more than ever, reformist leaders in Latin American 
countries seemed to be a potential threat. Juan Jose Arevalo, along with his Argentinian 
and Brazilian contemporaries, Arturo Frondizi and Joao Goulart, respected constitutional 
processes and supported the Alliance for Progress.1 Nonetheless, the Bay of Pigs fiasco 
solidified the United States’ hostility toward leftist reform and recast potential allies of 
the Alliance for Progress as subversive agents of the Soviet Union. 
During Kennedy’s administration, Guatemala again became a harbinger of US-
policy in Latin America. Ambassador John Bell decided Arevalo represented a threat that 
United States could not tolerate even though a majority of Guatemalans apparently 
wanted him to return to the presidency.2 Ignoring the former president’s repeated avowals 
of anti-communism, Bell preferred a military seizure of power over the risk of letting the 
popular reformist return to power. Though Bell conceded that civilian leaders were 
preferable to a military regime, he doubted whether it would be possible to find a 
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competent Guatemalan politician who could also defeat Arevalo. As a result, 
Ambassador Bell began to amend US policy in Guatemala to make dealing with the 
military leadership more palatable. His most significant contribution to US policy was to 
establish that the “primary and overriding objective of US policy in Guatemala should be 
to prevent it from becoming a Communist State.”3 While this goal was not unusual for 
Cold War policy in Latin America, Bell specifically pushed for the primacy of anti-
communism over genuine political or economic development. The result was antithetical 
to what Kennedy had promised with the Alliance for Progress: a repressive military 
regime that rejected democracy, social justice, and the rule of law. 
John O. Bell drove down the Inter-American highway to assume his position as 
Ambassador to Guatemala in December of 1961. Becoming ambassador was his most 
prominent achievement in a rapid climb through the State Department bureaucracy. The 
problems that plagued Guatemala would prove far different from those he faced in 
Copenhagen, but the ambassador embraced a broad, if not fully developed, Cold War 
policy that could be applied in Latin America as well as Western Europe: preventing 
communism at all costs. In Guatemala, Bell established the primacy of this overriding 
goal in his earliest reports, and though he felt that the Red Menace had to be defeated in 
the political, social, and economic arenas, he relied on fostering a close relationship 
between the United States and the Guatemalan military in building strong US-
Guatemalan relations. 
John Bell began a lifelong career in government service in 1928 at the age of 
sixteen. Initially s messenger boy for the Agriculture Department, Bell became a clerk 
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after two years, while attending night classes at George Washington University. Bell then 
learned that the State Department was offering an entry position that paid twenty dollars 
more a month than he was making.4 He took the job as a clerk, but quickly advanced to 
the Passport Office, where he continued to work through the decade as he finished his 
bachelor’s and law degrees. The young Bell displayed a strong work ethic and a drive for 
professional advancement that characterized his life in government service. 
 At the outset of the Second World War in Europe, Bell spent most of his time 
preventing German and Spanish communists from entering the United States.5 Bell 
worked on a new initiative to “replace all passports in existence” with redesigned 
documents that were difficult to forge because of a growing fear that foreign agents could 
easily produce counterfeits.6 When the United States entered the war, Bell shifted to the 
Aviation Division where he continued to build his career.      
After the war, Bell, now a self-declared “State Department man,” took advantage 
of the National War College’s invitation to Foreign Service personnel to attend classes at 
Fort McNair in Washington D.C.7 From 1946 to 1948, Bell acquired international 
management skills while attending lectures from General Leslie Groves, Robert 
Oppenheimer, and Dwight Eisenhower.8 His time at the National War College was a 
period of immense personal growth, and he acquired a lasting respect for the intellectual 
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prowess of the top brass of the military. Bell returned to the State Department in late 
1948, receiving his first foreign posting with the European Division. 
Stationed in Copenhagen, Bell began to climb the ladder of the State 
Department’s bureaucracy with almost annual promotions between 1948 and 1954. An 
emerging Cold Warrior, Bell believed that the United States had irresponsibly 
demobilized in Europe at the end of World War Two because “the concept of the 
Russians as enemies hadn’t really percolated thoroughly.”9  Though Bell had concerns 
about European security, he was not initially hawkish. He disapproved of missile 
deployments in Greece and Turkey in 1953 because he believed they would be an 
unnecessary provocation of the Soviets that would not reap long-term strategic 
dividends.10  He convinced Dean Acheson to oppose military support for Dutch efforts at 
reestablishing colonial rule in Indonesia.11 Reflecting later on the Marshall Plan, NATO, 
and the rapid expansion of America’s global power, Bell felt that his years in Europe 
were “the golden age of American foreign policy.”12 In European matters, Bell was 
comfortable with the Kennan approach favoring patient containment over aggressive 
confrontation with the Soviets.  
After a brief assignment in Washington D.C., Bell became Deputy Chief of 
Mission to Pakistan in 1955. Although he had no experience in Middle Eastern affairs, 
his growing reputation within the State Department made him a key figure in John Foster 
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Dulles’s plan to “build a wall against Sino-Soviet Imperialism.”13 Bell claimed that the 
greatest difficulty he had in Pakistan was cultural adjustment: he compared the 
“sophistication” of the Dutch with the “primitiveness” of the Pakistanis. In a country of 
“80-some million,” he stated, “there were perhaps 2,500 who were politically 
articulate.”14 These observations smacked of ethnocentrism, or at least, extreme cultural 
insensitivity. It is clear, in any event, that the assignment was not to Bell’s liking.  
 During the two years he served in Pakistan, Bell was rarely content with the 
situation. He believed that Dulles was attempting to transplant the Marshall Plan in the 
third world, but that fostering economic recovery in Europe was not the same thing as 
developing a modern economy in the Third World.15 Bell did not, however, offer a viable 
alternative.  Bell’s discontent in Pakistan shaped his world view as much as his time in 
Europe. He learned that developing nations required something more than piles of money 
to protect themselves from communism, and he linked this observation with a demeaning 
attitude toward the inhabitants of the Third World.  
In 1957, Bell took the first opportunity to leave Pakistan and returned to 
Washington D.C. He became the International Regional Director for Near East and South 
Asia.16 Bell also cultivated political connections with an eye on the 1960 election. At this 
point, most of Bell’s work for the State Department consisted of facilitating international 
aid, and he quickly gained the confidence of Kennedy’s man in charge of consolidating 
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America’s foreign-aid agencies into the Agency for International Development 
(USAID/AID), George Ball.  After Kennedy’s election, he was asked if he was interested 
in becoming Under Secretary of Administration. Bell rejected the offer because, as he 
later put it, the Kennedy team wanted him to help “clean out the State Department and 
get rid of all the dumb jerks.”17 Against the advice of Ball and Undersecretary of State 
Chester Bowles, Bell told Kennedy that the AID program did not need reorganization. 
Bell suggested that all that was needed was “two good men for each country in 
Washington and two good men for each country abroad” for a total of four hundred able 
and honest Foreign Service personnel.18 Kennedy retorted, “Hell, that’s more good men 
than I’ll get in the whole administration.”19 Despite his occasional sparring sessions with 
the president’s advisers, Bell collaborated with the Kennedy team in writing up a 
legislative proposal for the reorganization of USAID, which passed as the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961. 
The passage of the Foreign Assistance Act earned Bell some powerful new allies 
in Washington. Bell caught the attention of his former law professor, Senator J. William 
Fulbright, who was impressed by Bell’s work on foreign aid and spoke highly of him, 
boosting his status in the State Department. A few months after the Foreign Assistance 
Act passed, Bell received several promising offers. John Galbraith, Ambassador to India, 
wanted Bell as Deputy Chief of Mission. Bowles made a pitch for Bell in Iran.20 
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Ultimately, Bell turned both offers down citing financial reasons and a desire to remain 
relatively close to his family. Instead, he chose a posting as ambassador to Guatemala. 
In thirty-three years of government service, Bell proved to be a capable, dedicated 
diplomat with respectable anti-communist credentials. Although Bell voiced his 
disagreements with various policies of three presidential administrations, he preferred to 
follow prevailing trends in Cold War thought. Like many US officials, he believed that 
winning the Cold War necessitated a brand of anti-communism where economic and 
political strategies played a supporting role to a show a military strength. Despite his 
commitment to the State Department’s goals, Bell lacked a clear, distinctive vision of 
anti-communism beyond defeating what he had been told was a rival, and destructive, 
ideology. Bell was a State Department man, but within that context, a career man. His 
previous assignments did not require a well-developed approach to communism, but 
Guatemala presented an unfamiliar situation that demanded immediate, effective 
response. It was Bell’s job to prevent communists from gaining influence in Guatemala, 
and so he committed to that goal with little strategic thinking beyond the conviction that 
his course was correct. 
 
When John Bell chose Guatemala, he was given the ambassadorship on the 
condition that he drive to his new office to emphasize the importance of completing the 
missing link of the Inter-American highway in Guatemala.21 After driving through forty 
miles of dusty country without air conditioning, the new ambassador was surprised when 
the mayor of Huehuetenango greeted him at the border with a party of local dignitaries. 
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Wearing old clothes that were stained by sweat and “oozing dust”, Bell attended a 
reception where he gave his first speech in broken Spanish. He joked that he was 
probably “the dirtiest ambassador they had ever seen.”22  
  Bell arrived at the US embassy in Guatemala City at the end of December, 1961. 
Guatemalan politics were experiencing a period of heightened tension and turbulence at 
the time. After the assassination of President Castillo Armas in 1957, a retired general 
and long-time presidential contender Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes had won Guatemala’s 
highest office in the 1958 election. Ydigoras initially proved to be an effective ally for the 
United States in Guatemala due to his pragmatism, lack of ideological convictions, and 
singular devotion to his own survival.23 Reminiscent of the dictators that ruled Guatemala 
before the Ten Years of Spring, Ydigoras and his sycophants plundered public coffers 
and blamed ever elusive communists for the countries problems. The United States found 
Ydigoras’s claims of a communist threat credible, particularly after the Cuban 
Revolution, and supported the president despite Kennedy’s anti-dictatorial aspirations. As 
his tenure in office continued, however, the corruption and cronyism within his regime 
spawned a coup attempt. Led by nationalist junior officers, one third of the Guatemalan 
military openly rebelled against the government in 1960.24 The attempt to unseat 
Ydigoras failed, but many of the conspiring officers fled and began a civil war.25 By the 
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time Ambassador Bell assumed control of his post, the Ydigoras administration was 
becoming more of a liability than an asset to the United States. 
 At a highpoint in a career marked by regular promotion, Bell came to Guatemala 
determined to succeed. Bell believed that Guatemalan institutions were weak, corrupt, 
and lacked popular support. Governmental agencies, including the presidency, were more 
practiced in graft and repression than public administration. President Ydigoras 
exemplified the dysfunctional state, and Bell predicted that the president would not finish 
his term in office.26 The unpopularity of the Ydigoras administration resulted in political 
divisiveness that led Bell to assert “a developmental program is probably impossible.”27 
Bell saw communist agitators behind every public protest and student demonstration, and 
stated that they had enjoyed a “splendid year” as anti-communists divided and formed 
opposition groups against Ydigoras.28 Dismissing the genuine social and political 
concerns the anti-communist opposition may have had, Bell claimed that these groups 
believed Ydigoras had “exceeded the bounds of permissible graft” and was not sharing 
the spoils beyond his “sycophants and fellow grafters.”29 Even if Alliance for Progress 
initiatives were attempted, Bell feared that the funding would not leave the hands of 
Guatemalan administrators. Above all, Guatemala needed stability in order to overcome 
the challenge of communism. 
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Bell exempted the military from his criticism of the country’s leadership. The 
ambassador complained that the mission he inherited lacked information on the 
aspirations and attitudes of military officers and that the embassy needed to foster a 
closer relationship with its natural allies. The Guatemalan military was vehemently anti-
communist, and Bell speculated, “in all likelihood there are less crass motivation also 
present among the military, such as devotion to constitutional government, [and] 
intellectual conviction as to the merits of democracy.”30 Unwilling to rely on the civilian 
government, doubtful of the prospects for development, and threatened by domestic and 
international subversion, only the Guatemalan military could establish the order and 
stability necessary for Bell’s anti-communism vision. 
In his earliest cables to Washington, Bell favored the Guatemalan Armed Forces 
as the most effective partner for advancing US interests in the region. He petitioned 
Washington relentlessly to support the Guatemalan military. On February 9, 1962, he 
urged the State Department to expedite shipments of F-51 Mustang fighter planes to 
reinforce the Guatemalan Air Force.31 On the following day, while asserting that there 
was no evidence that Guatemala was in immediate danger of being overthrown by force, 
he emphasized that the army had an immediate need for communications equipment and 
T-33 jet fighters.32 Though he viewed the rebels as little more than a nuisance, Bell 
believed there was a high probability that they would follow the Cuban example and 
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begin protracted guerilla warfare in the countryside. Aiding the Guatemalan military in 
its efforts to eliminate the potential guerilla threat was an absolute necessity because “the 
US has nothing to gain and much to lose by [the] success [of ] rebel elements.”33 For 
Bell, military aid served a dual purpose of building a relationship with the armed forces 
while safeguarding the country against the fledgling insurgency. 
Along with his advocacy of a military buildup, Bell devoted his efforts to 
preventing, at any cost, a communist seizure of power. The Cuban Revolution, and the 
subsequent failure of the US invasion at the Bay of Pigs, gave a new urgency to 
maintaining US hegemony in Latin America, and Bell was not unusual in his enthusiastic 
red-hunting. He scoured intelligence briefs and after-action reports on guerilla operations 
seeking a clear Cuban connection. Both the Guatemalan Army’s intelligence units and 
the American ambassador sought to link Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, a prominent member 
of the 1960 military uprising and guerilla leader of growing acclaim, to Castro. In Zacapa 
province, raiders, allegedly commanded by Yon Sosa, stole a paltry sum of 18,000 
quetzals (roughly $2,100) from a United Fruit office on the same day that Guatemalan 
Army units were ambushed by insurgents fifty miles from Guatemala City. Bell reported 
that G-2, Guatemala’s military intelligence unit, believed that Castro had coordinated 
these attacks with Yon Sosa. G-2 informed its US contacts to expect a massive strike 
from Cuban MIG jets.34 Unsurprisingly, this aerial assault never materialized. The 
warning from G-2 seems far-fetched today, but Bell found the threat credible enough to 
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report to the Secretary of State. The Kennedy administration could not tolerate another 
Cuba, and every US official understood that presiding over such a setback would mark 
the end of a career. To both fulfill his duties and preserve his profession, Bell’s pursued 
any potential communist threat without hesitation. 
Despite their considerable efforts, neither the US embassy nor G-2 could find 
solid evidence of a communist conspiracy in Guatemala. This hardly hampered Bell, 
whose militant solutions to Guatemala’s communist problem found a new avenue. 
Rumors that Juan Jose Arevalo, the former president and popular reformer, was planning 
to return to Guatemala and run a presidential campaign for the 1964 election presented 
Ambassador Bell with a mission of significance. Conflating Arevalo’s reformism with 
Castro’s radicalism, Bell dedicated the next two years to doing everything within his 
power to ensure that Arevalo would not become the president of Guatemala.  
In late April 1962, three months after becoming ambassador, Bell’s predictions of 
a growing communist insurgency seemingly gained more credibility. The list of President 
Ydigoras’s allies grew shorter by the day, as the “Old Man” alienated elites with his 
perceived softness on domestic communism and enraged the urban classes with violent 
repression of student demonstrators and labor organizers.35 Amid the unrest, Ydigoras 
refused to bar Arevalo from running for office, which deeply troubled the State 
Department and the Guatemalan military. Guatemalan military leaders vowed that they 
would never allow Arevalo to enter the country. Ambassador Bell mirrored the military’s 
position, viewing Arevalo as another potential Castro. Fearing that the conditions for a 
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communist uprising now existed, Bell alerted Washington that Guatemala stood at the 
precipice of disaster. 36 
The State Department prepared for the worst: Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
prepared a resolution to justify U.S. military intervention in Guatemala to be presented to 
the Organization of American States should Ydigoras request assistance.37 George Ball, 
now Kennedy’s Under Secretary of State, informed Ambassador Bell that a battle group 
of 1,400 US troops was on alert and could hit Guatemalan soil within twelve hours of an 
attempted communist takeover.38 The ambassador again looked to Cuba to justify a direct 
intervention. Bell launched an investigation hoping to uncover that Cubans had air-
dropped propaganda to insurgent groups, who disseminated the material among 
dissidents in Guatemalan City. Unable to find a shred of evidence of such a plot, Bell 
blamed the inefficiency of Guatemalan surveillance and maintained that it was likely that 
Cuban airplanes were involved in the demonstrations.39 Despite his suspicions, Bell 
admitted that the existing evidence was insufficient for justifying intervention, but might 
still prove useful if the operation could be justified on other grounds. The Ydigoras 
regime teetered on the brink of collapse and the United States prepared for invasion. 
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 Ydigoras managed to survive the wave of spring protests by suppressing the 
demonstrations with the combined strength of the Guatemalan army and police forces. 
More than five-hundred Guatemalan civilians were killed to end the protests.40  Indicative 
of the precariousness of Ydigoras’ rule, military leaders, tired of the president’s schemes, 
demanded power in exchange for loyalty. The Guatemalan Armed Forces continued to 
support Ydigoras on the condition that he share power with a military cabinet.41 The State 
Department, particularly Rusk, welcomed the idea of joint rule, believing the generals 
could bring stability and credibility to the dissolving Ydigoras regime.42 Bell predicted 
that the military would try to oust Ydigoras before his presidential term expired and 
began to prepare the way for accepting military rule in Guatemala.  
It was an absolute necessity for Guatemala to remain a staunch US ally. The 
United States celebrated the 1954 coup as an early Cold War victory. Moreover, the 
possibility of losing Guatemala was widely seen to be a major blow to US prestige. For 
US policy makers, the threat of another Cuba far outweighed the potential political cost 
of installing a military state in Guatemala. The mobilization of a considerable US 
invasion force to counter unarmed protestors, a massive overreaction considering the lack 
of evidence of any communist plot, revealed the lengths the Kennedy administration was 
willing to go to ensure communists did not gain a foothold in Guatemala.  Ambassador 
Bell was aware of this situation and also knew that his steady climb through the State 
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Department hierarchy would end abruptly if Guatemala went the way of Cuba. The 
ambassador had little faith in Guatemala’s political leaders, especially Ydigoras, leaving 
him few viable alternative avenues. Development through the Alliance for Progress 
programs was too slow and uncertain in Guatemala corrupt political environment to 
manage the perpetual crises that plagued the country, so Bell cast his lot with the most 
reliable, anti-communist institution: the Guatemalan military. 
As time passed, Bell became increasingly sympathetic to the Guatemalan military. 
In August 1962, he wrote of the virtues of military rule in Guatemala and Latin America 
in general. Bell saw the Guatemalan military as the bedrock of the state and believed the 
cooperation between the US military and the Guatemalan Army would develop “respect 
for democratic and progressive policies,” whereas individuals within the private and 
political sectors would plunder US developmental aid to add to their personal wealth.43 
The Kennedy administration allocated twenty-seven million dollars in Alliance funds for 
Guatemala from 1961 to 1963, despite knowing that Ydigoras’s only concern was 
maintaining his personal power by bribing the oligarchy.44 Bell steered funding from the 
Alliance for Progress and USAID into programs administered by the military. Early 
initiatives sponsored riot control courses for police and literacy programs for soldiers, but 
gradually, the military used funds to indoctrinate and militarize Guatemalan youths 
through the euphemistically labeled Civic Action Program. Bell regularly praised the 
military’s efforts as a means to foster development through cooperation between the 
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armed forces and the civilian population.45 In reality, the military used these programs to 
conscript peasants and extend its presence into village life. Bell continued to channel aid 
money into the military as it expanded its grasp through so-called developmental 
projects. 
The ambassador was not the only State Department official who viewed the 
Guatemalan military as the United States’ most important ally in the country. Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk approved Bell’s close collaboration with the Guatemalan military 
solutions as an effective means to preventing another Cuba. In fact, during Bell’s time as 
ambassador to Guatemala, he seemed to have no greater supporter than Rusk.46 In the 
spring of 1962, as popular protest called for Ydigoras’s resignation, Rusk drafted a 
resolution for committing US ground forces to Guatemala to present to the Organization 
of American States. If the beleaguered president presented evidence of “international 
communist involvement” and requested assistance, the United States would urge member 
states to join it in taking action against communist aggression and subversion.47  
After the military forced Ydigoras to rule jointly with a cabinet staffed by ranking 
officers, Rusk wrote Bell that the cabinet would serve as “one of first tests whether 
energetic military action can be effective” and that the military ministers might generate 
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more popular appeal by cleaning up the Ydigoras administration.48 Moreover, Rusk 
suggested his openness to removing Ydigoras and advised the embassy that things might 
be better without him.49 Secretary Rusk acknowledged it was unlikely that President 
Ydigoras would remain in office until his term expired in 1964. He provided Bell with a 
list of potential parties, both allies and adversaries of US interests, that could unseat 
Ydigoras. Bell’s list noted the strengths and weaknesses of these groups and 
hypothesized what actions the United States might have to take should one of those 
groups overthrow the government. Unsurprisingly, conservative army officers were 
branded the most stable, US-friendly group, and Rusk requested the ambassador’s input 
in drawing up contingency plans for a military coup.50 In short, Rusk told Bell that the 
United States would recognize any usurper, civilian or military, who was committed to 
preventing communism in Guatemala. 
The Secretary was equally concerned about the prospect of Arevalo returning for 
the election. In an attempt to persuade Ydigoras to bar Arevalo’s return, Rusk arranged 
for President Kennedy to meet with the Guatemalan president to discuss the issue while 
Kennedy was touring Latin America.51 Ydigoras assured Kennedy that Arevalo would 
not become the president, even if he was allowed to participate in the elections. Neither 
Rusk nor Bell had any faith in President Ydigoras’s plans and feared that Arevalo’s 
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return would establish another communist beachhead in Latin America. Without a pliable 
civilian competitor who could defeat the popular former president, only the Guatemalan 
armed forces could bring stability, and maintain US hegemony, in the country.      
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CHAPTER IV 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
On a balmy afternoon in October 1962, Ambassador Bell sat down to compose a 
draft of US policy and operational guidelines in Guatemala. The document doled out 
responsibilities to US agencies, but its primary focus was to reaffirm the ambassador’s 
anti-communist approach. The document focused on political, economic, and military 
goals, but its most impressive feature was the many different ways the ambassador 
repeated and rephrased his call to eliminate the communist threat to Guatemala. USAID 
needed to provide financial support to the government to prevent instability; USIS would 
intensify anti-communist propaganda and destroy communist influence in schools; and 
the US military group was to continue training its Guatemalan counterparts in 
counterinsurgency warfare and riot control.1 All three agencies would collaborate in order 
to encourage the Guatemalan military to engage in more civic action programs. Bell 
assigned himself, the embassy staff, and “all elements as directed” the task of assuring 
the installation of an anti-communist government that would support both Alliance for 
Progress initiatives and US foreign policy abroad.2 By two in the afternoon, Bell finished 
the task, but his superiors were far too busy to read it. That very morning in Washington, 
Kennedy had looked at black-and-white aerial photographs of indistinguishable clumps 
of trees and tiny rectangular buildings—nuclear missiles in Cuba. 
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Soviet warheads in Cuba indicated that a new threat had emerged in the region. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis had legitimized Ambassador Bell’s brand of militant anti-
communism.  His previous efforts to find Cuban connections with Guatemalan dissidence 
now seemed rational, even prescient. The collaboration between Soviets and the Cubans 
appeared to prove that communist expansion in Latin America posed an immediate, 
existential threat. Although the US-Soviet confrontation in the Caribbean ended without a 
nuclear exchange, Cold War fears ran high. A new period of US intervention in the Latin 
America had begun. 
President Ydigoras was quick to pledge his full support while heaping encomiums 
on President Kennedy. Referring to Kennedy as “Your Excellency,” Ydigoras thanked 
the president for addressing the “danger [to the] American continent of [the] Communist, 
de facto government of Fidel Castro.”3 Ydigoras had viewed Castro as a threat since the 
beginning of the Cuban Revolution, and the president touted the fact that his demands for 
intervention in Cuba no longer seemed overzealous. While Ydigoras’ anti-Castro 
credentials cannot be doubted, the timing of the Cuban Missile Crisis likely preserved the 
unpopular president against an emerging threat from within the military.   
 By the end of November 1962,Ydigoras’s indifference toward Arevalo’s pending 
arrival provoked an open revolt from restless officers who had grown tired of the 
president’s schemes. For the second time, Ydigoras faced a rebellion from his own 
military, though this uprising had fewer participants and a fundamentally conservative 
agenda. The CIA reported the day before the attempted coup that a small faction of air 
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force officers planned an imminent assault on the loyalist command center at the 
Ciprisales military base in Guatemala City and would proceed to assume control of the 
government.4 To aid in their takeover of the capital, the rebelling officers secured an 
alliance with an army brigade stationed at a military base, Mariscal Zavala, on the 
outskirts of Guatemala City and twenty-two members of the Guardia de Honor, the elite 
praetorian force that guarded the President and his ministers. Fully aware of the situation, 
the United States government watched and waited. 
 Central Intelligence Agency memos described the rebel officers as non-leftist, 
anti-Arevalo, and friendly to the United States.5 While the coup attempt received no 
endorsement by the United States, the CIA did not assist Ydigoras. Nonetheless, most of 
the military remained loyal to the “Old Man” of Guatemala and thwarted the attack on 
Ciprisales.6 President Ydigoras likened the event to a boil bursting to relieve a festering 
sore.7 He took advantage of the situation and purged the armed forces, particularly the air 
force, of disloyal elements, arresting hundreds of military personnel. Not one to miss an 
opportunity for political gain, Ydigoras also ordered the arrest of numerous political 
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opponents.8  However, to the dismay of his loyal commanders and Ambassador Bell, 
Ydigoras still refused to bar Arevalo from the country. 
Having spent considerable time and energy over the past year procuring military 
hardware, especially aircraft, Bell was concerned about Ydigoras’s crackdown on the air 
force. A few days after the revolt, the ambassador and President Ydigoras met, and Bell 
expressed his worries. At the air force’s request, Bell had secured another shipment of T-
33 fighter jets for Guatemala, which were slated for imminent arrival. Ydigoras promised 
Bell that the air force would experience some reorganization, but it would remain intact 
and that the jets were still a modernizing necessity.9 Despite the president’s assurances, 
Bell believed that the arrests and expulsions were too harsh and that Ydigoras needed to 
maintain a close alliance with the military in order to manage the impending election 
crisis. In an attempt to bandage the fissures appearing between the armed forces and the 
government, Bell approved the delivery of jet fighters, claiming they were a symbol of 
the United States’ commitment to the Guatemalan military.10 For Bell, the most 
significant threat to US interests, and his own career, was the return of Arevalo. The 
United States could not afford to lose ground within its sphere of influence because of the 
squabbling within the Guatemalan elite. Ydigoras had weathered waves of civilian 
protests and military uprisings. Ambassador Bell could not risk the possibility that the 
unpopular president would become another Fulgencio Batista.  
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 While Bell strategized how to save Guatemala from communism, his superiors 
seemed content to let the ambassador control the situation as he saw fit. The upper 
echelons of the State Department had several priorities outside of Guatemala in the early 
1960s. The standoff in Europe had cooled after the Berlin Crisis in 1961, but the Old 
World still loomed large in Cold War geopolitics. In Vietnam, escalation continued 
unchecked and the recalcitrant Ngo Dinh Diem frustrated the Kennedy administration. In 
Latin America, the State Department focused on the issue of Cuba. Still, Guatemala 
clearly mattered, and Bell, as ambassador, appeared to have considerable influence over 
US policy in Guatemala. There is no indication that Rusk or other State Department 
officials questioned Bell’s initiatives or approach. The only member of JFK’s 
administration who did was Arthur Schlesinger Jr, Camelot’s court historian 
 Schlesinger occupied a unique position as Special Assistant to the President. 
While not a major maker of policy, Schlesinger did have influence within Kennedy’s 
inner circle.  Unlike Bell, Schlesinger did not see Arevalo as a nascent communist threat, 
and in January 1963, Schlesinger circulated a telegram through the State Department that 
challenged the accepted thinking on the popular Guatemalan reformer. Schlesinger 
conceded that open association with Arevalo should be avoided, but he postulated that the 
United States might be “missing a bet if we do not assign some non-official people to 
cultivate Arevalo quietly, explore his views, and see whether he can be steered in sensible 
directions.”11 Furthermore, he felt that Arevalo’s professions of anti-communism and his 
expressed desire to work with the United States should be taken more seriously; he found 
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no reason for the former president to have any ties to Castro or the communist world. 
Schlesinger concluded with a warning: “The present line is one of those self-fulfilling 
prophesies: if we persist in acting as if Arevalo were beyond all hope of salvation, he will 
certainly end up that way.”12  
Schlesinger’s appraisal of Arevalo developed from his optimistic view of how the 
United States could bring positive change to Latin America through democracy and 
building up the middle class. An avid proponent of Alliance for Progress reforms, 
Schlesinger’s opinion was rooted in modernization theory. Prominent academics in the 
social sciences held that education, social welfare, and competitive political parties could 
uplift traditional societies out of the hierarchical, economically stagnant systems, 
undermining radical political movements in the process.13 The military and 
socioeconomic elite often rejected forms of modernization as a challenge to their 
privileged position, which encouraged radicalization among marginalized groups. This 
approach toward Third World countries led Schlesinger to favor economic development 
and democracy as cornerstones of successful anti-communism. To Schlesinger, Arevalo’s 
current and historical political initiatives aligned more closely with the ideals of the 
Alliance for Progress than those of the reactionaries, militarists, and radicals that 
competed for power in Guatemala. 
 Unlike every other member of the Kennedy administration, Schlesinger seemed 
receptive to Arevalo’s public praise for the Alliance for Progress and his denunciations of 
Castro. A fellow academic with democratic credentials and a history of moderate reform, 
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Arevalo fit Schlesinger’s ideal for a Latin American leader. Considering the alternatives, 
a pseudo-civilian kleptocracy or a military dictatorship, Arevalo had more potential. The 
Guatemalan political and military elite would likely use Alliance funding to preserve 
their own narrow interests under the guise of modernization. If properly cultivated and 
controlled, an Arevalo presidency could advance Alliance for Progress programs while 
sapping the momentum of oppositionists and radicals.  Schlesinger’s telegram received 
no formal response. Most likely, the officials who received the telegram, including 
President Kennedy, had decided that Arevalo was, at best, a “menace” and that his links 
to Arbenz were evidence enough that he would encourage communism in Guatemala.14 
The fear that an avowed reformist could quickly transition to a radical revolutionary 
remained too great a risk for Kennedy and Bell to even consider the possibility of 
Arevalo’s return to presidency. 
In January 1963, with the Air Force coup attempt behind him, Bell could once 
again focus on Arevalo and the upcoming elections. Though he admitted that Ydigoras 
had considerable political skill, evidenced by his survival, Bell reported, “there is 
widespread feeling in Guatemala favoring a military coup to oust Ydigoras and [to] 
arrange for elections which would exclude the participation of Arevalo.”15 Despite this 
supposed opposition to Arevalo, Bell claimed that political moderates lacked the unity 
necessary to produce a significant challenger. Contradicting his earlier characterizations 
of Arevalo, Bell admitted that the former president was not a communist, but that “his 
                                                 
14
 Dean Rusk, “[Excerpt from Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Kennedy and Ydigoras on 
Juan Jose Arevalo],” March 26, 1963, Digital National Security Archive, National Security Files, Country 
Files: Guatemala, Box 101, John F. Kennedy Library, 2. 
15
 John O. Bell, “Guatemala,” January 21, 1963, Digital National Security Archive,  Presidential Office 
Files, Box 118, John F. Kennedy Papers,  John F. Kennedy Library, 1.  
 42 
 
confused, ill-balanced, political philosophy of ‘spiritual socialism,’ fed by deep prejudice 
against the United States, served the Communist purpose well during his administration” 
and was a precursor to the “Communist dominated Arbenz administration.”16 Bell also 
suggested that Ydigoras might be conspiring with Arevalo. He noted that Ydigoras 
continued to withhold his endorsement of any presidential candidate and speculated that 
the president was in contact with Arevalo in order to secure a life of comfort in 
Guatemala after the election.17  
Bell maintained his belief that forging strong ties with the military remained the 
best way to create a stable, anti-communist Guatemala. Ranking officers had already 
declared that they would not allow Arevalo into the country, and the November coup 
attempt proved that the armed forces planned on keeping their word. Although Bell 
deemed it unlikely, he maintained that finding an acceptable candidate who could beat 
Arevalo remained his priority.18 Failing that, he urged a concerted effort to assess 
Arevalo’s popularity outside of the capital, covertly reduce the former president’s 
prestige, and dissuade him from running in the election. That option, however, seemed 
unlikely to succeed. In that case, should Ydigoras be displaced before the election, Bell 
suggested grooming military men suitable for governance.19 Bell promised another 
interagency appraisal of Guatemala in March, but given the ambassador’s preference for 
the military, the likelihood of a change in approach seemed minimal.   
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 Although it appeared that Bell had cast his lot with the Guatemalan armed forces, 
the ambassador scheduled a final meeting with the intractable Guatemalan president. The 
discussion focused almost entirely on Arevalo’s return. Ydigoras waited patiently as Bell 
expressed his concern that Arevalo would win the election if he were allowed to run for 
president. When the ambassador finished, Ydigoras presented a convincing defense of his 
actions. He explained that Guatemala’s borders made it practically impossible to prevent 
a determined individual from entering the country. If Arevalo were arrested after entry, 
Guatemalans would view him as a hero, or martyr, in the mold of Castro.20 An arrest 
would lead to court appeals, public disorder, and a spectacle that would only increase his 
stature and renown. Furthermore, there was no legal basis for keeping Arevalo out of the 
country and Ydigoras, “like his friends in the United States,” respected the rule of law.21 
The wisest course of action, the president explained, would be to allow Arevalo to run for 
office, which Ydigoras believed would divide and weaken all of the leftist candidates.  
 The meeting between Ydigoras and Bell presented new possibilities and 
challenged the accepted logic of the Kennedy administration. Not only did Ydigoras 
inform Bell that Arevalo’s popularity was overrated, he also revealed that his own 
relationship with the former president was misunderstood. Ydigoras admitted that among 
the “rich people” of Guatemala, rumors had circulated that he had “sold out” to 
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Arevalo.22 In fact, Ydigoras opposed Arevalo. He simply believed that the defeat of the 
former president required “cold and clear planning and not letting hate drive one into ill-
considered and hasty actions.”23  The president’s argument apparently impressed Bell. In 
a report to the State Department summarizing the meeting, he stated that he was “inclined 
to agree with Ydigoras” that it would be a mistake for the Guatemalan government to 
keep Arevalo out of the country.24 Bell’s suddenly more favorable assessment of 
Ydigoras suggested that the ambassador might be open to safeguarding Guatemala 
against communist threats through non-military means. Arevalo’s impending arrival, the 
unrest within the armed forces, and the ambassador’s two years of cultivating a close 
relationship between the embassy and Guatemalan officers, however, all prevented Bell 
from changing course at so late an hour.  
  As the ambassador’s options narrowed, the likelihood of a coup increased. The 
Guatemalan military remained unconvinced by Ydigoras’s political schemes. After 
meeting with Bell, Ydigoras continued to maneuver, and finally endorsed a candidate, his 
longtime crony Roberto Alejos. That decision pushed Defense Minister Enrique Peralta, 
who formerly avoided plots to overthrow the president, to reconsider his position. Bell’s 
Deputy Chief of Mission, Robert Corrigan, met secretly with Licenciado Arturo Peralta, 
the brother and confidant of the Minister of Defense. As the brother told Corrigan, 
Ydigoras’s selection of Alejos, whose venality earned him enemies in all sectors of 
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Guatemalan society, guaranteed that Arevalo would win the election.25 Furthermore, 
Peralta’s brother repeated the claim that Ydigoras was working with Arevalo and could 
not be trusted. The only remaining option appeared to be a coup. 
 According to Corrigan, Licenciado Peralta also explained the benefits of a 
military government headed by his brother. The new military regime would immediately 
enact economic reforms, place capable men in the ministries, and bring much needed 
integrity and efficiency to the Guatemalan government.26 Peralta had considerable 
support within the armed forces, however the army would not act until it was certain that 
the coup would succeed and their rule would be legitimized by the United States. 
Corrigan gathered that the Defense Minister’s brother sought some indication of how the 
United States would respond to Ydigoras’s expulsion. The silence in Corrigan’s report 
was telling. The United States would give no open assent, but neither would it prevent 
Peralta from seizing control. 
 President Ydigoras was not a fool. He calculated that the military would move 
against him with the quiet consent of the United States. Seeking self-preservation above 
all, Ydigoras finally acceded to the army’s demands and claimed that Arevalo was 
ineligible for office because he was a communist. He also forbade the commercial 
airlines on the Mexico-Guatemala route from flying him to Guatemala.27 Ydigoras now 
claimed that if Arevalo participated in the election, he would win by a substantial 
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majority.28 Ydigoras also expressed his frustrations with the United States. He 
complained that President Kennedy and the US government had failed to deal with him 
responsibly when his vigilance alone had warded off communism in Guatemala.29 
President Ydigoras’s sudden reversals and denunciations read like the last acts of a 
desperate man. The Guatemalan military was skeptical of Ydigoras’ about-face and 
continued to believe that the steps he had taken were simply political maneuvers. 
 Violence erupted as speculation increased that Arevalo was about to return. In late 
March, bombs exploded throughout Guatemala City. In his report, DCM Corrigan wrote 
that the army staged these bombings to justify the imposition of a state of siege. Five 
days later, Corrigan’s suspicions of an army plot were confirmed, and the government 
declared a state of siege because of a “vast plan [of] agitation and violence” by armed 
communist groups.30 Bell noted that the government suspended Article 46, among other 
constitutional guarantees, which guaranteed Guatemalans the right to enter or leave the 
country.31 The military had fulfilled its promise to block Juan Jose Arevalo from 
exercising his legal right to run for president. 
 When he had been president of Guatemala, Arevalo had refused to be intimidated 
by threats from the military, and he had not changed in the thirteen years since he had left 
office. Bell received word from “high Arevalist sources” that Arevalo would return on 
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March 31 at eleven in the morning.32 According to the source, Mexican president Adolfo 
Lopez Mateos had provided Arevalo with a private plane, and several important Mexican 
officials agreed to accompany him, as did twenty four foreign journalists from the US, 
Mexico, and the Dominican Republic.33 Meanwhile, Defense Minister Peralta assured the 
embassy that he remained determined to prevent Arevalo’s return.34 The moment that 
Ambassador Bell had prepared for was seemingly at hand. 
In fact, Arevalo had already arrived in Guatemala alone on March 27 at a 
secluded farm airstrip. He drove to Guatemala City where he stayed with friends, 
changing his location at night.35 On March 29, Arevalo met with his principal followers 
to determine a course of action. The CIA speculated that Arevalo and his followers might 
soon organize an uprising, but the former president managed to hold only a few quiet, 
clandestine meetings with peasants and supporters.36  
 On March 30, 1963, the Guatemalan Army, acting under orders from Defense 
Minister Enrique Peralta, forced President Ydigoras out of office. While the CIA knew of 
the plot before it was initiated, the embassy did not confirm the coup until the following 
day, after receiving word from Peralta’s brother that the defense minister had become the 
head of state and that all commanding officers of the Guatemalan Armed Forces 
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supported the Colonel-President.37 There was no sense of shock or disapproval at the US 
embassy. In the year since Arevalo had announced his candidacy, Ambassador Bell and 
his staff had accepted the idea that the rule of a military government was a positive good 
in Guatemala. As the Peralta’s regime attempted to consolidate its position, the situation 
in Guatemala rapidly deteriorated as popular discontent transformed into civil war.  
A series of crises legitimized a hardline approach to anti-communism in 
Guatemala that resulted in the second overthrow of a democratically elected government 
in less than a decade. The idealism and promise of the Alliance for Progress’s renewed 
relationship with Latin America crumbled as the Kennedy administration confronted 
Castro’s Cuba. Under these circumstances, Bell’s fixation on blocking Arevalo from 
running for president seemed rational and necessary for stymieing communist influence 
in Guatemala. The Alliance for Progress was placed on the backburner because Bell 
believed that only the military could produce both stability and anti-communism. The 
ambassador held that development programs and modernizing initiatives were too slow 
and uncertain for the immediate problems he faced in Guatemala. Although alternative 
solutions arose, Bell and his superiors never considered anything but Arevalo’s exclusion 
from Guatemalan politics as an option. Bell briefly reconsidered his positions, but his 
plans were too far along to radically change course. Instead, Bell continued to advocate 
for the Guatemalan military’s positions. The elaborate fantasy of Arevalo’s communist 
subversion guaranteed that the only plausible partner for the United States in Guatemala 
was its armed forces. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE COUNTERINSURGENCY STATE 
Arevalo acted bravely when he entered Guatemala, but after Peralta seized power, 
he had no choice but to flee the country. The day after the coup, Arevalo left for 
Tapachula, Mexico, as Guatemalan security forces arrested scores of Arevalista leaders.38 
Ambassador Bell reported, undoubtedly with some satisfaction, that the army would 
make use of the disorganization and lack of resources of Arevalo supporters to “make 
effective counteraction most unlikely.”39 Whether the result of genuine optimism or self-
interest, within the month Bell’s glowing appraisal of the situation in Guatemala proved 
as rooted in reality as his association of Arevalo with communism. 
 The ambassador wasted no time in praising Peralta. Two days after the coup, Bell 
defended the Peralta regime as having, through “honest convictions,” saved the country 
from communist control.40 Moreover, the new government pledged to restore honor and 
efficiency in governance. Should “leftist opponents of the new regime” threaten the 
military-government, it would be able to organize an effective response without 
requesting US assistance.41 Elections and the constitution would be suspended while the 
Peralta regime solidified its control over Guatemala. Once the State Department produced 
its “minimal requirements” for what it would consider a constitutional regime, Bell 
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promised he would ask Peralta to commit to a timetable for elections.42 The ambassador 
suggested that the United States recognize the Peralta government within the week to 
maintain a friendly relationship with the new regime. 
 The following day, in an interview with the Miami Herald, President Peralta 
announced that elections could probably be held “in more or less than two years.”43 
Immediately afterward, Ambassador Bell defended the long delay. Peralta needed time to 
build up the private sector and develop a reputation for decency and honesty. Sensing that 
Peralta’s indeterminate plans for elections might trouble both Guatemalan’s and US 
officials, Bell suggested that perhaps the comments were simply “off the cuff.”44  
Despite Peralta’s anti-democratic leanings, Bell maintained that the coup and the 
military government furthered the interests of freedom in Guatemala, the United States, 
and the hemisphere. Had the elections gone forward, the ambassador argued, Arevalo 
would have taken advantage of the “naiveté and innocence of the Guatemalan people” 
and opened Guatemala to “communist infiltration and control.”45 Furthermore, Bell 
contended that “responsible elements” of Guatemalan society showed courage and 
foresight that had prevented civil war by overthrowing the government.46 Suspending the 
constitution and the democratic process were the only viable courses of actions, and the 
ambassador believed it would be a mistake for Guatemalans to hold elections in the near 
                                                 
42
 Ibid., 1. 
43
 John O. Bell, “[U.S. Posture toward Colonel Peralta’s Government],” April 3, 1963, Digital National 
Security Archive, National Security Files, Country Files: Guatemala,  Box 101, John F. Kennedy Library, 
1. 
44
 Ibid., 1,2. 
45
 Ibid., 2.  
46
 Ibid., 1. 
 51 
 
future. Bell declared that “right thinking Latin Americans” would agree with his 
assessment.47 If the United States fully supported the Peralta regime, it would bring order 
and progress to the perpetually backward nation. Bell’s patronizing rhetoric rarely, if 
ever, surpassed this early defense of the Peralta regime. His analysis would prove to be 
fatally wrong. 
 Not all members of the State Department shared Ambassador Bell’s favorable 
assessment of Guatemala’s military government. On April 4, George Ball composed a 
partial response to the ambassador’s vigorous defense of Peralta. Ball directed 
Ambassador Bell to approach Peralta with a proposal of forming a Council of State, and 
led by Peralta comprised of distinguished citizens, who would hold executive and 
legislative powers until the promised election. He further proposed that the council 
include mostly civilians who represented the leading political sectors of the country.48 
With a broader political base provided by the Council, the new government could fix a 
time for elections, carry out essential programs, encourage cooperation within the region, 
and obtain more widespread acceptance. Ball stressed the importance of holding elections 
within a year and allowing all democratic parties to participate, especially considering 
that current acceptable presidential contenders were more likely to continue to work with 
the Peralta regime if it looked less like a dictatorship.  
Ball went on to lecture the ambassador on the inherent problems of military 
regimes. Ball’s foremost concern was the vague, two-year projection of military rule. In 
his view, the Peralta regime would be able to deal with opposition, now sure to have 
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communist support, only by infringing on civil liberties, which would foster resistance. 
Ball observed that military regimes were not sensitive to popular reactions to 
authoritarianism and feared that opposition elements might be strengthened, “in will if 
not number,” should Peralta prolong his rule. 49  Often inflexible and deeply conservative, 
military governments were likely to find persuasive reasons to maintain their position of 
power and forgo needed reforms at the expense of the electorate. Military regimes, Ball 
added, had a “greater ability to remove a bad government than create a good one.”50 He 
concluded by stating that an early return to democratic practices and the restoration of 
constitutionality would better protect Guatemala from Arevalo returning to power by 
reducing the development of dangerous political intrigue common in closed political 
systems.51 This mild chastisement by his superior had little apparent effect on the 
ambassador as he continued to support Peralta’s personal rule. Peralta retained total 
executive and legislative control in Guatemala for over three years. 
 The Under Secretary of State’s criticism of Bell’s approach in Guatemala 
reflected his own concerns about a concurrent foreign policy quagmire: Vietnam. Ball 
had long advocated the adage of avoiding a land war in Asia and felt that the Kennedy 
team’s uncompromising commitment to “win” in Vietnam had obstructed alternative, 
more politically oriented, strategies in Southeast Asia.52 Nevertheless, in the final months 
of the Kennedy administration, Ball found himself ensnared by troubling developments 
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within the South Vietnamese leadership. Although the government of President Ngo Dinh 
Diem was not the military dictatorship Ball described to Ambassador Bell, Diem’s 
brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu personally controlled South Vietnam’s security forces and used 
them to brutalize opponents and rivals.53 Ball lamented that the callousness of Diem’s 
leadership required the United States to distance itself from “Nhu’s noxious activities” 
even though  the US “had in effect created him in the first place.”54 In Peralta’s 
Guatemala, Ball saw a close enough parallel to caution the ambassador against following 
a similar path. Ironically, four months after challenging Bell’s work in Guatemala, Ball 
became one of the chief architects in the conspiracy that toppled the Diem government, 
installed a military regime, and resulted in the assassination of both Diem and Nhu. In 
both Vietnam and Guatemala, the United States’ interference in the name of anti-
communism intensified ongoing conflicts and brought disaster to the respective regions. 
 As April 1963 came to a close, the Central Intelligence Agency reported that 
several guerilla groups had jointly declared war against the Peralta government.  The 
Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT)—the Communist Party of Guatemala—claimed 
to speak for the various opposition groups now under its political guidance.55 The 
expulsion of Arevalo and subsequent seizure of power by the military provided the 
disparate oppositionist groups of student activists, political dissidents, and guerilla 
fighters with a common cause.  Clashes between insurgents and army units became 
                                                 
53
 James A. Bill, George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1997), 154. 
54
 Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, 371. 
55
 Central Intelligence Agency, “Planned Declaration of War by Guerilla Units against the Government,” 
April 24, 1963, Digital National Security Archive, National Security Files, Country Files: Guatemala, Box 
101, John F. Kennedy Library, 1-2. 
 54 
 
increasingly frequent in the following months, and it soon became undeniable that 
Guatemala was in the midst of a civil war.  
With Arevalo out of Guatemala and Ydigoras replaced by a military regime under 
Colonel Enrique Peralta, Bell believed that that the most significant communist threat to 
the Guatemalan government had ended. The Peralta regime laid out its agenda, 
pronouncing the eradication of extremist threats to the existing government as its main 
objective.56  Promising a restoration of governmental honesty, the Peralta government 
vowed that it would implement Alliance for Progress initiatives, honor international 
commitments, and promote a democratic climate. The military would turn over power to 
an elected government after it had fulfilled these goals. Excepting George Ball’s warning 
to the ambassador, the harshest criticism US officials mustered against Peralta was that 
he might have been too “honest and upright” for Guatemalan politics.57 His reputation, 
however, did not prevent the new Guatemalan president from appointing three family 
members to key ministries in the government. Peralta rejected the internal political 
machinations that Ydigoras relied upon to remain in power, and relied on family and 
trusted allies to maintain his rule. This new administration would be disciplined, loyal, 
and ruthlessly efficient in the pursuit of its mission.  
 Ambassador Bell remained optimistic about the prospects of the Peralta regime. 
The government he had helped install, in his view, was proud, dedicated, and willing to 
use force to eliminate potential threats. In his messages to his superiors, Bell suggested 
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that a vast majority of Guatemalans supported the unconstitutional regime because it 
promised a modicum of social and economic progress, and if the regime made 
improvements, the population would tolerate an autocratic political system.58 Bell 
downplayed the ongoing guerilla activities and declared that the Peralta regime faced no 
serious threat to its stability. The ambassador had seemingly achieved his objective—or 
so he thought. 
The Central Intelligence Agency was less sanguine about the Peralta government. 
Its analysts believed that, in their current disorganized state, oppositionist forces did not 
yet have the ability to overthrow Peralta, but worried that the insurgent groups could 
develop into a serious problem in time. The three leading opposition groups—
Arevalistas, the PGT, and Yon Sosa’s guerilla fighters— had apparently held meetings 
with representatives  from leftist student groups to discuss the overthrow of President 
Peralta. The groups remained divided on strategy. Arevalistas favored the suspension of 
subversive activity so that the state of siege would be lifted; the PGT and the guerillas 
favored robberies, bombings, and the assassination of key government leaders.59 The CIA 
concluded that although these groups did not yet challenge the government, a unified 
insurgent movement could unleash another Cuban-style revolution in Guatemala. 
The Cuban Revolution had demonstrated the potential of a dedicated, rural 
insurgent group under the command of a charismatic leader. And indeed the Movimiento 
Revolucionario 13 Noviembre (MR-13) hoped to replicate Castro’s success by mirroring 
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his 26th of July Movement. The leadership of MR-13 boasted two figures of growing 
renown: Marco Antonio Yon Sosa and Luis Augusto Turcios Lima. Both men were 
former Guatemalan Army officers, veterans of the 1960 rebellion against Ydigoras, who 
had received training at the School of the Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia.60 In the 
aftermath of the failed 1960 uprising, they found refuge among indigenous peasants and 
came to believe that change would come to Guatemala only through popular armed 
struggle. The two guerilla leaders subsequently travelled to Cuba where they received 
further training and funding, and attracted the full attention of the CIA. The agency noted 
that Yon Sosa, in particular, was highly regarded by the Castro regime, which had 
provided him with fifty-thousand dollars to continue his guerilla campaign against the 
Guatemalan government.61  
After returning from Cuba in November 1962, Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima began 
to work closely with other oppositionist groups, namely Guatemala’s communist party, 
the PGT. The PGT had formed its own armed wing, which merged with MR-13 in 
December 1962 to form a nominally united armed opposition front, the Fuerzas Armadas 
Rebeldes (FAR).62 Groups within FAR retained considerable autonomy, and members 
remained loyal primarily to their commanders rather than to the organization. Still, 
increased collaboration between these groups marked a significant period of rejuvenation 
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of oppositionist momentum. Under Peralta’s rule, a communist insurgency, funded by 
Cuba, actually emerged as a significant threat. 
 
With the regime change in Guatemala, US officials began to reassess priorities 
and goals.  The AID program remained unchanged as American officials hoped that 
Peralta would be able to utilize the existing thirty million dollars in unexpended funds 
that the Ydigoras government had failed to utilize.63 Both the State Department and the 
Department of Defense agreed that the interests of the United States would be served best 
by maintaining a close relationship with the Guatemalan armed forces and increasing 
military aid to Peralta’s government. In its Military Assistance Program, the Department 
of Defense focused on the objective of establishing the Guatemalan military as the 
institution that would not only safeguard the government from communist penetration, 
but also act as the chief contributor to social and economic development through civic 
action programs. The Military Assistance Program allotted one million dollars to the 
Guatemalan Army for the construction of roads, bridges, public buildings and schools 
and created public water utilities and initiating reforestation projects.64 This figure was 
dwarfed by the estimated twelve million dollars to fulfill standing Defense Department 
obligations to the Guatemalan military.65 Military Assistance Program personnel 
projected that, by the end of the decade, Guatemalan security forces would have adequate 
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hardware and funding to meet US goals, but that a potential shortfall existed in the 
number of adequately trained personnel. 
The State Department’s Internal Defense Plan echoed the position and goals of 
the Department of Defense. Referring to the prevention of Arevalo’s candidacy, the 
report boasted that “immediate primary objective of our IDP was effectively 
implemented.”  66 The plan reiterated Bell’s assertion that the Peralta regime faced no 
serious threat and that Guatemalans had apparently accepted military rule as a welcome 
change from Ydigoras. Nonetheless, the Guatemalan government needed to confront 
serious issues.   
The most significant concern was the lack of proper training in security personnel, 
which was compounded by the fact that appointments to high-ranking positions in the 
police and military were based on patronage instead of merit. When selecting new heads 
of Guatemala’s police forces, Peralta chose loyal army officers instead of police officers 
who had received extensive US training through the AID sponsored Public Safety 
Program. This marked a growing divide between the actions of the Peralta regime and the 
demands of the United States. Even Ambassador Bell, who had facilitated Peralta’s 
seizure of power and acted as the regime’s most vocal advocate within the State 
Department, began to have his doubts about the new Guatemalan government. 
On September 7, 1963, Bell compiled his progress report for the Internal Defense 
Plan. In the five months since the establishment of Peralta’s military government, Bell’s 
enthusiasm about the regime had shifted to disappointment. The ambassador found that 
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the Peralta government had become difficult to work with because of “its sensitivity and 
over developed sense of dignity with respect to ‘sovereignty’”67  While Peralta’s regime 
dealt with subversives efficiently, it was slow, even unwilling, to implement measures 
and programs that addressed social and economic problems. When Peralta and his 
representatives were questioned about setting a timetable for elections, they became 
irritated and claimed that the country’s “social problems” required a solution before a 
presidential election was feasible.68 Despite the Peralta government’s resistance to US 
advice, Bell maintained that replacing Ydigoras with a military regime had achieved the 
United States’ immediate goals by blocking Arevalo’s return. Unwilling to accept that the 
military regime might prove as problematic as George Ball had cautioned, Ambassador 
Bell concluded that the United States should stay its course in Guatemala and continue to 
keep on good terms with influential figures in Peralta’s administration. 
Other US officials were not as kind as Ambassador Bell towards the increasingly 
dictatorial Peralta. Officials with the Agency for International Development met to 
determine whether a reduction in Public Safety Program funding might effectively 
chastise Peralta for ignoring needed reforms and appointing his own men to head 
Guatemalan police agencies over US recommendations for the posts.69 Writing directly to 
Ambassador Bell, George Ball stressed that his “central purpose” as the ambassador 
should be to cultivate greater influence over Peralta and to steer him away from personal 
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dictatorship.70  Ball cautioned that there was a growing concern in Washington regarding 
Peralta’s refusal to address political and economic problems while refusing help and 
advice from emissaries of the United States. In South Vietnam, the relationship with the 
US-installed Diem regime was deteriorating rapidly, and Ball hoped to avoid a similar 
situation in the Western Hemisphere.  Advocating the “slow and careful” courting of 
Peralta and his advisors, Ball stressed that the ambassador deliver the message that 
continued political repression would drive the opposition underground and invited 
insurrection.71 Bell had helped install the Peralta regime, but the new president had 
secured his position and would prove difficult to dislodge. For all of its supposed military 
and economic might, the United States found itself relatively powerless to control an 
allied government within its sphere of influence because it had committed itself to the 
regime by endorsing its subversion of democracy.   
In Washington, Ball was not alone in his unease with Peralta’s uncooperative 
streak. Dean Rusk, after reviewing the AID proposal to reduce funding from the Public 
Safety Program, instructed the ambassador to present Peralta with an ultimatum. Peralta 
had already appointed loyal army officers to lead Guatemalan police forces against the 
advice of the United States, but now the regime was refusing to meet the minimum 
financial and staffing requirements set by the bilateral Public Safety Program.72 If the 
Guatemalan government failed to honor its commitments, Rusk warned, then AID would 
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reduce its contributions, including military equipment.73 Rusk believed that Peralta 
needed to be reminded that maintaining law and order through well-trained security 
forces was in the interest of both the United States and Guatemala. A spike in guerilla 
attacks in the following months would test Guatemalan security forces, the military 
government, and the US ambassador who had helped bring it to power. 
 Both the US embassy and the CIA devoted considerable attention to uncovering a 
Cuban connection to insurgent activities in Guatemala. When a bomb prematurely 
exploded, killing alleged PGT member Jose Ibarra Escobar, the embassy accepted the 
rumor that the deceased had been a “Cuban-trained technical expert in explosives” as 
fact.74 Similarly, the embassy suggested Cuban involvement when an unnamed fifteen-
year-old student was killed in an attack on a police station because he was a member of a 
leftist youth organization.75 The CIA began to take a more direct role in assisting the 
Guatemalan government with interrogation of captured guerillas and proudly announced 
the effectiveness of its techniques after its agents recruited a former member of Yon 
Sosa’s MR-13 group.76 Though the relationship between Castro’s Cuba and leftist 
opposition to the Peralta regime was often minimal at best, US officials exaggerated 
collaboration between these groups to fulfill the Cold War canon of international 
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communist conspiracy. Paradoxically, Ambassador Bell, while hunting for Cuban 
influence in Guatemalan dissidence, denied that the insurgency was a genuine threat.  
 For John Bell, 1964 was a difficult year. Bell owed his ambassadorial 
appointment to his close connections with the Kennedy team, and the assassination of the 
president in November 1963 dealt him a heavy blow. The new year with a new president 
began with problems that continued for the rest of the ambassador’s term. Guerilla forces 
went on the offensive throughout Guatemala and established themselves as a serious 
threat to the military regime. Bell was no longer the active Cold Warrior who averted 
potential communist threats. The ambassador went on the defensive and showed signs of 
being overwhelmed by the communist insurgency. 
 The recent union of guerilla groups into the FAR revealed its potential through a 
series of coordinated attacks in January, 1964. In the countryside, guerillas regularly 
clashed with the army units in the Izabal Department. The influence of the small band in 
the predominantly rural region was growing and threatened to hamper access to 
Guatemala’s most important port, Puerto Barrios.77 More troubling to the ambassador, 
insurgents assaulted urban targets. Mortar rounds shelled a Guatemala City airport on 
three occasions and then targeted an Honor Guard compound. Bell noted that FAR 
pamphlets signed by Commandant Yon Sosa had been distributed in nearby 
neighborhoods warning people to stay away from the airport to avoid future attacks made 
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“in retaliation for [the] military dictatorship’s action against guerillas” in Izabal.78 At the 
end of the month, the FAR assassinated Colonel Jose Oliva Valdez, an intelligence 
officer of the Puerto Barrios garrison, in a drive-by machine gun attack in Guatemala 
City.79 In his monthly assessment, Bell admitted that the insurgency had escalated its 
attacks, but that the military, as a result of US training, was becoming a more efficient 
counterinsurgency force.80 Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, Bell continued to 
claim that the guerilla forces did not pose a major threat to the Peralta government. 
Responding to the demands of his superiors in Washington and the increasing 
problems on the ground, Bell suggested a reorientation of US domestic policy in 
Guatemala. The new policy objective emphasized greater cooperation with the Peralta 
regime to advance the economic and social goals of the Alliance for Progress and the 
reinstatement of a democratic, constitutional government.81 Following the advice of Ball 
and Rusk, the ambassador suggested that making overt demands on the Peralta 
government would not work. Instead, the careful cultivation of influential members of the 
regime had proven most effective. By building his relationship with Peralta’s brother and 
other influential members in the regime, Bell encouraged elections for a Constituent 
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Assembly that would be held May or June.82 The ambassador stated that long-term social 
and economic programs would undermine the insurgency over time, but that increased 
support for the Guatemalan military and police was necessary to maintain the momentum 
of the current counterinsurgency efforts. The organization of these security forces, 
however, remained a contentious issue between US officials and Peralta’s government. 
 State Department officials, CIA analysts, and US military advisors all agreed that 
the National Police and Guatemalan intelligence agencies needed to be professionalized 
and restructured in order to meet the growing insurgent threat effectively. Rusk’s plan of 
threatening to pull the funding of the Public Safety Program in order to to push Peralta 
into reforming the police and appointing US-trained officers to leadership positions 
continued to be ignored by the regime. With guerillas targeting urban areas with more 
frequency, Bell reported that the need for an effective police force was now Guatemala’s 
most significant national security problem.83 A collaborative effort between AID and 
Guatemalan police officers produced a plan for reorganization that would be presented to 
the Minister of Government, but Bell feared that the Peralta regime would continue to 
dismiss these suggestions. DCM Corrigan presented the police reorganization plan to the 
Minister of Government, who agreed that the reforms were badly needed, but the Peralta 
government continued to ignore the suggestions.84  
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Despite Peralta’s unwillingness to listen to its US allies on internal security 
matters, his regime finally set a date, May 24, for elections to the Constituent Assembly. 
The elections, however, came with a caveat. No opposition parties would be allowed to 
participate. In fact, all the parties that ultimately participated presented nearly identical, 
government-selected, platforms.85 The brief prospect of political stability and progress 
rapidly dissolved. 
A proliferation of coup plots against the Peralta administration marked the 
immediate popular response to the announcement of the election. Military leaders, 
political oppositionists, journalists, and students of all political identities conspired to 
overthrow the government, but these self-interested groups lacked the resources and 
political unity to overthrow the regime. Ideological fissures within the FAR’s tenuous 
alliance began to appear between the PGT, which favored political participation, and the 
MR-13, which rejected the elections and demanded a continuation of armed struggle.86 
Although participation in the elections was low, May 24 came and went without a serious 
disruption, and a toothless, conservative Constituent Assembly granted the pretense of 
democratic progress to the Peralta regime.   
 Through the summer of 1964, the US embassy continued to lament the inaction of 
the Peralta regime, yet still discounted the danger posed by opposition forces. Bell 
recommended that the Public Safety Program officials delay their assessment of 
Guatemalan police forces because the government continued to rely on the army as both 
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an urban and rural counterinsurgency force.87 Major guerilla engagements had largely 
subsided; they averaged, Bell reported, “one murder a month for the past five months,” 
targeting plantation owners and a few army officers.88 Peralta’s neglect of public security 
seemed justified by the diminishing momentum of the insurgency. The optimistic 
assessments of the embassy, and the arrogance of Peralta’s government quickly 
dissipated in the face of a sustained assault that began in the provincial village of Panzos. 
On October 16, 1964, a guerilla attack on a Panzos military detachment initiated a 
wave of constant violence that lasted into the 1970s. An estimated twenty guerilla 
fighters killed three soldiers and seized all of the weapons and ammunition in the 
barracks after the army detachment retreated.89 The Guatemalan Armed Forces launched 
a combined sweep of the area and successfully captured six guerillas. Ambassador Bell’s 
repeated statements that the insurgency was merely a nuisance garnered much less 
credence from a surprised Johnson administration. 
 Dean Rusk cabled the embassy demanding explanations. He ordered Bell to urge 
Guatemalan authorities to conduct a “thorough interrogation” of the guerillas with the 
express purpose of obtaining intelligence that proved Cuban involvement in the attack.90 
Rusk’s call for thorough interrogation no doubt alludes to the military intelligence’s 
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penchant for torture. Bell relayed Rusk’s demand immediately. No record of the 
information gathered from the detained insurgents has been made publicly available.  
 Meanwhile, Secretary Rusk received reports of increased guerilla activity around 
Puerto Barrios in the Izabal department. While the resident military commander promised 
US embassy officials that the guerilla threat was “more or less” under control, high 
unemployment in the port town provided recruiting opportunities for the insurgency.91 
Additionally, MR-13 units were engaging in small skirmishes and detonating bombs 
within the city with increasing regularity. Rusk demanded more information from the 
embassy, specifically whether the attack in Panzos and the activity in Puerto Barrios were 
related. 92 Bell, despite evidence to the contrary, continued to claim that the guerillas 
were not a threat. 
 Bell’s final denial of the capabilities of opposition forces revealed the extent of 
the ambassador’s intransigence.  In his report to Rusk, Bell stated that although the 
Panzos attack represented “the boldest and most publicized guerilla action in some time,” 
it did not represent an expansion of the insurgency because Panzos was a mere eleven 
kilometers from the border of the Izabal department.93 Bell postulated that the small, 
highly mobile bands falsely presented a larger range and greater collaboration than they 
actually enjoyed. The ambassador confirmed that the guerillas in Panzos and Puerto 
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Barrios were probably members of the FAR, but that their loyalties and strategies were 
determined by individual unit commanders.94 Seeking to reassure the Secretary of State, 
Bell praised the Guatemalan military’s swift, overwhelming response. He declared that 
the Peralta government showed its “capability [to] control [the] situation without too 
much difficulty” and demonstrated an increased will and determination to crush the 
insurgent forces.95 During the last months of Bell’s term in office, a steady stream of 
raids, ambushes, and bombings exposed the flaws in the ambassador’s thinking. 
 Assisting Peralta’s coup to prevent the potential election of the pseudo-communist 
Arevalo had seemed like a major accomplishment in John Bell’s steady advancement 
through the State Department. By 1964, however, Bell’s achievement revealed how 
unprepared the ambassador was for his post. Although he had helped Peralta come to 
power and had significant contacts within the regime, Bell found that his influence within 
the Guatemalan government was almost negligible. Although the Peralta regime allowed 
highly restricted elections for a powerless representative body, Bell failed to implement 
any significant policy initiatives. Even when faced with urban guerilla attacks, the Peralta 
government refused to address what US officials deemed Guatemala’s most pressing 
national security issue, the creation of an efficient police force. Contradicting his attempts 
to convince Peralta to improve the police, Bell repeatedly downplayed the significance of 
the insurgency, even as its attacks grew bolder and spread throughout the country. In his 
final year as ambassador, Bell’s delusions finally gave way as he retreated from the 
violence and terror that gripped Guatemala.      
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 Pressure from guerillas remained constant into 1965. On New Year’s Eve, urban 
insurgents burned down the USAID transport garage, planted defective bombs at the US 
Army Mission headquarters, and attempted to assassinate a Guatemalan colonel, Hector 
Medina, in a drive-by-shooting.96 Although most of these attacks were failures, they 
represented a shift in focus from rural areas to urban centers. Bell’s repeated assurances 
that the situation was in hand no longer seemed credible in Washington. Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann, a respected authority on Latin 
America, reported to the National Security Council that guerilla activity in Izabal was a 
chronic problem and that urban terrorism was polarizing the electorate in anticipation of 
the promised presidential contest.97 Despite Mann’s appraisal, he suggested that military 
and police aid should not be increased. Mann believed that Guatemalan security forces 
had more than adequate resources and that further funding would stymie the potential for 
elections. 
 Mann reiterated his point in a letter to Bell. The letter signified an attempt to 
reorient US-policy in Guatemala away from its nearly exclusive partnership with the 
military. Mann stated that, while the military could be a useful force against communism, 
they should not interfere in “normal political processes.”98 Furthermore, Mann informed 
Bell that it was the ambassador’s duty to persuade Peralta’s government to promote 
                                                 
96
 John T. Dreyfuss, “Fifth Monthly Guerilla Report,” February 6, 1965, Digital National Security Archive, 
Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State, Box 2252, Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-1966, 
National Archives, 1. 
97
 Thomas Mann, “Progress Report on Guatemalan Internal Defense Plan,” December 2, 1964, Digital 
National Security Archive, Records of the Agency for International Development, Records of the Office of 
Public Safety, Record Group 286, Box 70, National Archives, 5. 
98
 Thomas Mann, “[Security Assistance to Latin America],” January 21, 1965, Digital National Security 
Archive, Commission for Historical Clarification, Department of State, 2. 
 70 
 
democracy in Guatemala.99 Effectively reprimanded for his policies, Bell retreated from 
his formerly active role until he left office in September. 
 While Ambassador Bell had transitioned from vigorous interventionist to a 
passive observer, the insurgency escalated throughout Guatemala. Guatemala City and 
other urban areas were particularly hard hit, and the Guatemalan government declared a 
state of siege in February 1965. Bombings, kidnappings, and political assassinations 
plagued Guatemalan cities while guerillas maintained pressure from their stronghold in 
Izabal. In June, Bell reported that the U.S. military group chief and the Air Force attaché 
had received death threats from the FAR.100 In the following years, increasingly desperate 
insurgents fulfilled their promises, killing and kidnapping several US officials. 
  When asked about his transition from the ambassadorship of Guatemala to an 
advisory position at STRIKECOM in Miami, Bell was evasive and vague, claiming that 
he “turned down the position” because of “personal reasons.”101 Regardless of Bell’s real 
motivations for vacating his post, when he left Guatemala in September 1965, the country 
was in far worse shape than when he arrived in 1961. A military regime had replaced a 
democratic government.  Quiescent, disorganized opposition groups had developed into a 
unified, communist-inspired insurgency. Civil war sewed indiscriminate violence in both 
the cities and countryside. Only four years had passed, but the idealism of the Alliance 
for Progress seemed like a distant dream when confronting the harsh realities in 
Guatemala.  
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Although Bell’s successor, John Gordon Mein, successfully facilitated the 
transition from Peralta’s military government to the freely-elected presidency of Mario 
Mendez Montenegro, the Guatemalan Armed Forces had already firmly established their 
control over the government and forced the Mendez administration to cede its power to 
the generals. Mendez would be the last civilian president of Guatemala for over twenty 
years.  
As the insurgent forces continued their campaign, the United States increased 
military aid and sent military personnel to act as advisors. Several sources, including a 
high ranking Guatemalan police official, have claimed that as many as one thousand 
Army Green Beret’s played an active-combat role in the counterinsurgency effort, 
although US officials have categorically denied the allegation.102 Under advice from US 
Navy and Special Forces officers, Guatemalan commanders began to incorporate the use 
of paramilitary death-squads alongside normal operations as part of an emerging 
counterterror doctrine.  
After a right-wing death squad associated with the military raped, murdered, and 
mutilated a former Guatemalan beauty queen for decrying human rights abuses, the FAR 
retaliated by assassinating two US military advisors and kidnapping Ambassador 
Mein.103The FAR kidnapped the ambassador with the intent of exchanging him for a 
captured rebel leader, but when Mein attempted to escape, the rebels “cut him down.”104 
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John Gordon Mein, the inheritor of Bell’s legacy, became the first United States 
ambassador killed in the line of duty. 
 By the end of the decade, the brutal tactics of Colonel Carlos Arana that 
combined the counterterror of death-squads with a scorched-earth policy in the 
countryside, quelled the insurgency for most of the 1970s. Arana’s massacres earned him 
the title of “the Butcher of Zacapa.” In 1970, the Butcher became the President of 
Guatemala and maintained order through disappearance, torture, and assassination.105 The 
Counterinsurgency State, in many respects, was set in motion with the derailment of 
democracy and legitimization of military rule that occurred under Ambassador John Bell.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 The beginning of the 1960s represents a tragedy of missed opportunity between 
the United States and Guatemala. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress promised a new era of 
economic and social progress that would overhaul the battered relationship between the 
United States and its southern neighbors. In Guatemala, the potential reelection of Juan 
Jose Arevalo, a proven reformer and proponent of the Alliance for Progress, seemed like 
the fulfillment of the promise of change. Pervading Cold War mentalities, however, 
ensured there would be no second chances for either Arevalo or the United States. Fears 
of communist infiltration, exacerbated by the partnership between Cuba and the Soviet 
Union, reduced Kennedy’s idealistic initiatives to empty rhetoric as his administration 
pursued the interventionist mentality that had long characterized US-Latin American 
relations.  
The Kennedy and Johnson administrations attempted to combat communism in 
Latin America with political and economic incentives through the Alliance for Progress. 
By the end of Johnson’s administration, however, the program was an admitted failure. 
The Alliance for Progress was meant to counter the example set by Cuba, but the 
potential spread of Castro’s revolution, the prevailing policy of containment, and the 
overriding need to maintain the United States’ sphere of influence led the administration 
and its officials to rely on military expedients when crises erupted. The United States 
reduced its commitment to the Alliance for Progress with the goal of addressing more 
immediate problems, but the situation in Guatemala only grew worse. By cancelling 
elections and facilitating regime change in the name of stability and anti-communism, the 
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United States and its Guatemalan allies produced widespread civil strife and inspired a 
unified communist opposition. Although the United States had the capacity to force 
change in Guatemala, it could not determine the outcome it desired. The thirty-three 
years of civil war in Guatemala that followed the 1963 coup revealed major limitations of 
US power and the deleterious effects of its interventionist policies.    
Ambassador Bell fostered a close relationship with the military because of 
pervading Cold War trends and his own personal biases. As a result, Bell facilitated a 
military seizure of power at a critical moment in Guatemalan history. This decision 
solidified the military’s rule over Guatemala for the next twenty-three years and 
condemned the country to more than three decades of civil war. The ambassador’s power, 
like his vision, proved limited. As George Ball had warned the ambassador after the 1963 
coup, once Peralta’s military regime took power, it refused to implement reforms and 
ignored both the demands of the Guatemalan people and the advice of US officials. 
Insensitive to local concerns and lacking in foresight, Bell’s unsophisticated brand of 
anti-communism brought disaster to Guatemala. 
Bell’s tenure in office represented a failure in policy made all the more tragic 
because of the potential of the road not taken. Just as the 1954 coup portended future 
interventions by the United States throughout Latin America, instead of becoming a 
“showcase of democracy” Guatemala became the first of many US-sponsored 
counterinsurgency states that used torture, forced disappearance, and death squads to 
eliminate the perceived communist threat.1 By the 1980s, state-terror evolved into 
                                                 
1
 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala, 57. 
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genocide and the United States found itself unable to distance itself from the murderous 
military regime that it had helped to build. 
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